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Text or Consequences? 
Jane S. Schacter† 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The magnetic pull of taxonomy is a well-worn feature of 
scholarship in the realm of statutory interpretation and 
beyond. Casting competing theories in bold relief and in terms 
of what separates them produces sharp and lively exchanges. 
And so it has been with textualism in statutory interpretation. 
The approach was once dubbed the “new textualism,”1 though 
presumably the moniker of novelty can be dropped now that 
twenty years have passed since textualism first appeared, close 
on the heels of its avatar, Justice Antonin Scalia, taking his 
seat on the Supreme Court. In those two decades, textualism 
has been set against intentionalism, purposivism, dynamic 
interpretation, pragmatism, and other worthy competitors in a 
vigorous normative debate.2  
As part of this contest over interpretive first principles, 
Justices Scalia and Stephen Breyer have engaged one another 
repeatedly, and they show no sign of fatigue as they continue a 
long-running interpretive road show that has brought this 
debate to various venues and to C-SPAN viewers.3 The lines of 
  
 † William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law, Stanford Law School. Thanks 
to Jessica Spradling for excellent research assistance and to the participants in the 
Symposium for helpful comments and discussions. 
 1 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 
623 (1990). 
 2 See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
LEGISLATION 765-98 (4th ed. 2007). 
 3 Justice Scalia’s core ideas are concisely laid out in ANTONIN SCALIA, A 
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION (1997). Justice Breyer’s competing views on legislative 
history are laid out in Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting 
Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845 (1992), and his broader views on the centrality of 
statutory purpose are laid out in STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK 88-
105 (2010). The two have debated each other numerous times. See, e.g., Brooke Bellomy, 
Justices Scalia, Breyer Speak at Lecture Series, DAILY TOREADOR (Nov. 14, 2010), 
http://www.dailytoreador.com/news/article_7bf7c942-f04a-11df-b524-0017a4a78c22.html; 
Constitutional Conversation (C-SPAN television broadcast Apr. 21, 2005), available at 
http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/Conversation; Constitutional Issues (C-SPAN 
television broadcast Dec. 5, 2006), available at http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/ 
ConstitutionalIss; Original Intent and a Living Constitution (C-SPAN television 
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the overall debate are, by now, familiar.4 Scalia stresses the 
singular legitimacy and crisp constitutional pedigree of 
statutory text, and the imperative of suppressing judicial 
policymaking.5 Breyer trumpets the greater commitment of his 
approach to values like meaningful legislative supremacy, the 
functional value of consulting legislative history, and the 
pragmatic virtues of a nondogmatic approach that is open to an 
eclectic range of interpretive resources.6  
It has become somewhat common for observers of this 
debate to proclaim that “we are all textualists now.”7 Indeed, 
some commentators have flatly declared the triumph of 
textualism, though it is uncertain just what that means in light 
of the distinctions drawn by some of the same observers 
between “moderate” and “aggressive” textualism, and 
associated arguments about the convergence of text- and 
intent-based theories.8 The convergence hypothesis has been 
resisted in some quarters based on the belief that textualism is 
implacably “radical” at its conceptual core.9 This radicalism, 
however, has been ascribed more to scholarly proponents of 
textualism than to those who practice it as judges. 
It is the gap between theory and practice that I would 
like to reflect on in this short essay. To borrow from the law 
and society framework and adapt the idea for our purposes, let 
us call it the gap between textualism on the books (its formal 
theory) and textualism in action (how it is actually applied in 
  
broadcast Mar. 23, 2010), available at http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/Intenta; 
Principles of Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation (C-SPAN television broadcast 
Oct. 26, 2009), available at http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/Statuto. 
 4  For a concise overview, see Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of 
Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 
119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1761-68 (2010). 
 5 See generally SCALIA, supra note 3. 
 6 See generally BREYER, supra note 3; Breyer, supra note 3. 
 7 See Jonathan R. Siegel, Textualism and Contextualism in Administrative 
Law, 78 B.U. L. REV. 1023, 1057 (1998) (“In a significant sense, we are all textualists 
now.”); see also, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings 
of the “Judicial Power” in Statutory Interpretation, 1776-1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990, 
1090 (2001) (“[T]he proposition that statutory text . . . ought to be the primary source of 
statutory meaning . . . needs little defense today. We are all textualists.”); Jonathan T. 
Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 43 (2006) (“[W]e are all 
textualists in an important sense.”); Marjorie O. Rendell, 2003—A Year of Discovery: 
Cybergenics and Plain Meaning in Bankruptcy Cases, 49 VILL. L. REV. 887, 887 (2004) 
(“We are all textualists now.”). 
 8 See, e.g., Molot, supra note 7, at 43; Caleb Nelson, What Is Textualism?, 91 
VA. L. REV. 347, 348-49 (2005). 
 9 See generally Jonathan R. Siegel, The Inexorable Radicalization of 
Textualism, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 117 (2009). 
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cases). I have no quarrel with the idea that textualism on the 
books can be quite radical. I would like to suggest, though, that 
textualism in action can be, and often is, deployed in a far more 
pragmatic way, and that highlighting that point can suggest 
some new normative inquiries. To develop this point, I will use 
as my frame of reference the interpretation of federal statutory 
law,10 and focus on textualism’s most famous adherent. That 
seems only appropriate as this symposium coincides with 
Justice Scalia’s twenty-fifth anniversary on the Supreme 
Court. The particular point I would like to press is this: while 
textualism on the books conspicuously eschews the legitimacy 
of consequentialism in statutory interpretation, textualism in 
action often uses strikingly consequentialist methods. In other 
words, it can and does argue for and against particular 
interpretations of statutory language based explicitly on the 
policy consequences that would follow—consequences that are 
not imputed to Congress as part of the legislative purpose.  
I mean something less global and more refined than a 
general claim that “textualism is as activist as anything else.” In 
particular, I mean the specific idea that judicially determined 
policy consequences can, and often do, figure quite prominently 
in textualist reasoning and method. This idea is, of course, 
anathema to the intellectual claims and premises of textualist 
theory. Indeed, on occasion, Justice Scalia has gone out of his 
way to dissociate himself explicitly from this style of argument, 
saying, for example, “I do not think . . . that the avoidance of 
unhappy consequences is adequate basis for interpreting a 
text.”11 Revealing and probing this aspect of textualism in 
practice can give us a fuller and more accurate picture of the 
method, and open up an important set of prescriptive questions 
that are missed when we take textualism at face value and 
debate its wisdom only as an abstraction. 
II. DISCUSSION 
Textualism’s consequentialist tendencies are apparent 
at three levels of analysis: general claims of substantive goods 
it supposedly produces; the textual canons it accommodates 
  
 10 The idea of looking at textualism in action ought to extend to state courts 
as well, though that question is beyond my scope here. See generally Gluck, supra note 
4 (gathering empirical evidence suggesting “modified textualism” is alive and well in 
the state courts). 
 11 Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125, 141 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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and employs; and particular statutory readings related to 
policy consequences. 
First, at the most general level, textualism is itself 
conceived and justified in strikingly consequentialist terms. 
Consider the many salutary results claimed by its proponents. 
Among other things, textualism is said to encourage judicial 
restraint;12 promote democratic values;13 avoid the particular 
“harm” that results from permitting courts to “psychoanalyze[] 
Congress rather than read[] its laws”;14 curb the undue 
influence of lobbyists, interest groups, and unelected staffers;15 
and further the rule of law by making the meaning of statutory 
law more accessible to citizens.16 And the list might go on.17  
To be fair, the justification for textualism might be 
restated as more intrinsic than instrumental by focusing on the 
familiar claim that the Constitution demands textualist 
methodology.18 But that claim depends on a contestable view of 
the Constitution—and one that is itself bound up with, and 
inspired by, the institutional consequences it is said to produce. 
Moreover, the other, and more obviously consequentialist, 
claims for textualism enumerated above persist. Rather than 
have a somewhat metaphysical debate about the difference 
between a consequence and a claim of inherent worth, then, let 
us simply stipulate that proponents of textualism commonly 
tout several desirable consequences that they claim their 
approach will produce.  
Second, Justice Scalia’s textualism accepts and 
accommodates a number of canons that can be, and have been, 
  
 12 SCALIA, supra note 3, at 17-18 (arguing that intentionalism allows judges 
to “pursue their own objectives and desires” and should thus be replaced by textualism, 
which will confine them to “what the legislature said,” not “what it meant”). 
 13 See Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 417 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that textualism will give Congress “a sure means by which it may work the 
people’s will”). 
 14 Id. 
 15 See Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 98-99 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring); 
SCALIA, supra note 3, at 32-37. 
 16 See SCALIA, supra note 3, at 17 (comparing intentionalism to Nero’s 
“posting edicts high up on the pillars, so that they could not easily be read”). 
 17 See generally John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 
2387, 2476 & n.319 (2003) (citing portions of Lon L. Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean 
Explorers, 62 HARV. L. REV. 616, 636 (1949), as a defense of formalism of the textualist 
sort in terms of its costs and consequences). 
 18 SCALIA, supra note 3, at 34-35. 
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deployed in consequentialist fashion.19 As a general matter, 
Scalia has criticized substantive canons as questionable “dice-
loading rules.”20 But he has approved the use of what he calls 
“established canons of construction,” which he suggests can be 
properly employed to show that “some permissible meaning 
other than the ordinary one applies.”21 The mother of all 
consequentialist canons is undoubtedly the rule that statutes 
should not be construed to produce absurd results. By definition, 
the absurdity doctrine is oriented precisely to avoiding bad 
policy consequences. In a textualist critique of this canon, John 
Manning collected a number of opinions in which Scalia (as well 
as textualist Judge Frank Easterbrook) employed it or approved 
of its use.22 Manning argues that textualism ought to banish the 
absurdity canon—or, on my reading of his argument, drive the 
canon underground by reframing it in terms of background 
conventions.23 His own critique notwithstanding, however, 
Manning freely acknowledges that neither Justice Scalia—nor 
for that matter Judge Easterbrook—have jettisoned absurdity in 
the name of textualism.24 Interestingly, Scalia has not only 
applied the absurdity canon on its own, but has, on occasion, 
linked it with more semantically oriented canons, such as 
expressio unius,25 thus giving those kinds of canons their own 
consequentialist twist. 
The consequentialist use of canons as part of textualism 
is not limited to absurdity. Other canons deemed “established” 
  
 19 On the general ways in which canons are associated with the justices’ 
ideologies, see James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the 
Elusive Quest for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2005). 
 20 SCALIA, supra note 3, at 28-29. 
 21 Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 404 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 22 See Manning, supra note 17, at 2419 nn.122-23 (citing Burns v. United 
States, 501 U.S. 129, 135 (1991) (Scalia, J., joining majority opinion); Green v. Bock 
Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527-28 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring); City of 
Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Serv., Inc., 536 U.S. 424, 449 n.4 (2002) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452 (1987) (Scalia, J., 
concurring); United States v. Seaboard Sur. Co., 236 F.3d 883, 885 (7th Cir. 2001) 
(Easterbrook, J.); Kerr v. Puckett, 138 F.3d 321, 323 (7th Cir. 1998) (Easterbrook, J.)). 
 23 Manning, supra note 17, at 2419-31; see also John C. Nagle, Textualism’s 
Exceptions, ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, Nov. 2002, http://www.bepress.com/cgi/ 
viewcontent.cgi?article=1035&context=ils. 
 24 Manning, supra note 17, at 2419-20, 2471. 
 25 Expressio unius est exclusio alterius reflects the idea that including 
particular things in a statute implies the exclusion of others. See BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 620 (8th ed. 2004). Justice Scalia has indicated support for the idea that 
the absurdity principle imposes a limitation on expressio unius. See Pauley v. 
Bethenergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 719-20 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Burns v. 
United States, 501 U.S. 129, 136-38 (1991) (Scalia, J., joining majority opinion). 
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by Scalia have also been used in this way.26 For example, Scalia 
has invoked clear statement rules in ways explicitly calibrated 
to preventing policy consequences deemed inconsistent with 
the normative tenets underlying such rules. In the realm of 
federalism, for example, he argued in Rapanos v. United States 
against an interpretation of the Clean Water Act that would 
“authorize an unprecedented intrusion into traditional state 
authority.”27 There are substantial questions about whether the 
clear statement rule employed in Rapanos can credibly be 
considered well established given its recent vintage, but the 
pertinent point for our purposes is the manner in which it was 
used, not the fact of use itself.  
In the realm of disability law, Justice Scalia has used a 
clear statement rule to argue against the application of Title III 
of the Americans with Disabilities Act to foreign-flag ships. In 
this context, he appealed to, among other things, the risk of 
subjecting ships to inconsistent international regulatory 
requirements.28 These arguments can be reframed as matters of 
reasonable meaning (as in, “what sensible Congress would 
trample state prerogatives or create the risk of international 
commercial chaos in this fashion?”), but that strikes me as a 
thin defense against the claim of canonical consequentialism. 
We can go through a similar exercise with respect to other 
canons as well.29 
Third, and perhaps most significant for my analysis, 
textualism can be deployed in a consequentialist fashion when, 
without regard to canons, particular readings of a statutory 
term are preferred or disfavored based on the policy 
consequences that such readings are thought likely to produce. 
I am thinking here of instances in which the relevant policy 
consequences are not attributable in a specific way to 
congressional choice. Take, for example, Justice Scalia’s 
  
 26 For a discussion of canons deemed “established” by Scalia, and a critique of 
the category itself, see Philip P. Frickey, Interpretive-Regime Change, 38 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 1971, 1987-92 (2005). 
 27 Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 738 (2006). 
 28 Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 545 U.S. 119, 149 (2005) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
 29 See Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 19, at 13 nn.48-51 (listing examples of 
opinions that utilize canons, several of which are authored or joined by Justice Scalia, 
including: Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 452-53 (2002) (expressio unius); 
Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 114-15 (2001) (esjudem generis); Sutton v. 
United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S 471, 482, 487 (1999) (Whole Act Rule); and Ford Motor 
Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 225-26, 226 n.8, 233 n.19 (1982) (in pari materia)); see also 
supra text accompanying note 22. 
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Rapanos opinion interpreting the Clean Water Act. He not only 
invoked the clear statement rule alluded to above, but also 
launched a screed against the excesses of federal regulation, 
citing $1.7 billion in annual costs incurred by those seeking 
wetlands permits and helping to make a consequentialist case 
for his reading of the statutory terms.30  
Consider, as well, Scalia’s dissent in Babbitt v. Sweet 
Home.31 In vigorously disputing the majority’s construction of the 
term “take” in the Endangered Species Act to include habitat 
modification, Scalia made many arguments, including that 
it produces a result that no legislature could reasonably be thought 
to have intended: A large number of routine private activities—for 
example, farming, ranching, roadbuilding, construction and 
logging—are subjected to strict-liability penalties when they 
fortuitously injure protected wildlife, no matter how remote the 
chain of causation and no matter how difficult to foresee (or to 
disprove) the “injury” may be (e.g., an “impairment” of breeding).32 
Note that this argument collects and emphasizes a set of 
consequences thought to be beyond the pale, but does not 
attempt to impute this concern to the enacting Congress in any 
specific or factual sense. It loosely invokes a hypothetical 
Congress, but employs a rhetorical device that, in previous 
work, I have argued is akin to “the Court more or less play[ing] 
ventriloquist to a hypothetical congressional dummy” because 
“[t]he important move here is the one made by the Court, not 
Congress: the identification of the policy baseline against which 
the range of plausible legislative meanings is gauged.”33  
In an article about the 1998 Supreme Court term, I 
called this category of interpretive resources “judicially-
selected policy norms.”34 When Justice Scalia argued in various 
cases during that term, for example, that a proffered reading of 
a statute should be rejected because it would undermine 
settlement incentives, lead to expensive factual inquiries, 
generate boondoggles, create a zany system, or produce 
perverse policy results of various stripes,35 he chose the critical 
  
 30 Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 721. 
 31 Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 
714 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 32 Id. at 721-22. 
 33 Jane S. Schacter, The Confounding Common Law Originalism in Recent 
Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation: Implications for the Legislative History Debate 
and Beyond, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1, 25 (1998). 
 34 Id. 
 35 See id. at 63-71 app. B. 
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policy norm, used it to guide interpretation, and did so in a 
straightforwardly consequentialist way.  
Nor was he alone in using this mode of analysis. To the 
contrary, I found that mode to be utterly routine—it appeared in 
73% of that term’s statutory interpretation opinions—and to 
cross conventional interpretive divides.36 The regular use of these 
consequentialist arguments, along with an eclectic array of other 
resources, prompted me to suggest that the idea of “common law 
originalism” described the Supreme Court’s interpretive 
practices better than any of the conventional “isms” could. 
My own analysis looked only at a single Supreme Court 
term, but the evidence suggests it was no outlier. Nick Zeppos’s 
analysis of a random sample of Supreme Court cases decided 
between 1890 and 1990 reflected an eclectic range of resources, 
as well as significant use of what he called “[c]onsequentialist 
or practical considerations.”37 He found these considerations to 
be used in nearly one-third of the cases. That is less frequent 
usage than I found, though still substantial.38  
More relevant for our purposes, perhaps, is that 
subsequent scholarly analyses of the Supreme Court’s practices 
in statutory cases have also found frequent use of judicial 
policy norms.39 Indeed, it has persisted in a variety of 
substantive contexts.40 And recent work sheds some new light 
on the use of these judicial norms. Anita Krishnakumar has 
disaggregated the category by distinguishing between norms 
  
 36 Id. at 18 tbl.1. 
 37 Nicholas Zeppos, The Use of Authority in Statutory Interpretation: An 
Empirical Analysis, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1073, 1097 (1992). 
 38 I suspect the difference is attributable to our having defined the category 
differently. The operative categories here can be somewhat slippery because, as I 
suggested above, the rhetoric can be deployed to impute the consciousness of 
consequences to Congress, not the interpreter. An argument that simply invokes x 
consequence to defeat an interpretation might be counted differently than one that 
says, “It simply could not have been Congress’s intent to produce x.” In substance, 
however, they are often the same, and I would treat them as such, unless the opinion 
cites some specific evidence of congressional concern with the relevant consequence. 
 39 See Anita S. Krishnakumar, Statutory Interpretation in the Roberts Court’s 
First Era: An Empirical and Doctrinal Analysis, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 221, 224-25, 228-29, 
235-38 (2010); Miranda McGowan, Do as I Do, Not as I Say: An Empirical Investigation 
of Justice Scalia’s Ordinary Meaning Method of Statutory Interpretation, 78 MISS. L.J. 
129, 173 (2008); Alan Schwartz, The New Textualism and the Rule of Law Subtext in 
the Supreme Court’s Bankruptcy Jurisprudence, 45 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 149, 150-55, 
192-97 apps. A-B (2000); Nancy Staudt et al., Judging Statutes: Interpretive Regimes, 
38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1909, 1911, 1960 (2005). Frank Cross found less frequent usage of 
practical considerations, but also appears to have used a more restrictive 
understanding of the term. See FRANK B. CROSS, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 134-43, 147-48 (2009). 
 40 See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 39 (bankruptcy); Staudt, supra note 39 (tax). 
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oriented toward “legal landscape coherence” and those oriented 
toward “statute-specific coherence,” and has noted that Justice 
Scalia favors the former category.41 Her analysis of the early 
Roberts Court supplies many examples of these kinds of 
consequentialist arguments, including arguments by Scalia, for 
whom she found “[p]ractical [c]onsequences” to be the third-
most used interpretive tool, following only “[t]ext/[p]lain 
[m]eaning” and “Supreme Court [p]recedent.”42 
Similarly, in an extended analysis of Scalia’s dissents, 
Miranda McGowan documented that he regularly employed a 
consequentialist style of argument.43 In her data, this style of 
argument appeared in some 70% of the dissenting opinions.44 
She also somewhat disaggregated the category. Canvassing the 
various dissents, she separated out, for example, what she 
called “absurdity-lite” arguments that stressed the policy 
anomalies that would result from a given interpretation; the 
approach of “[p]utting [p]urposes in Congress’s [m]outh”; the 
appeal to what Justice Scalia often calls “common sense”; and 
the frequent concern with the “[w]orkability” of different 
interpretations of the statute.45 These are recurring interpretive 
themes, each one in some way focusing on the results thought 
to flow from a particular reading of statutory language.  
III. CONCLUSION 
Given that I am not, myself, a textualist, this might be 
the point in the paper where you expect me to say “gotcha.” And 
while that is always an attractive possibility, I confess, I think 
the better response might be something more like “phew.” 
Textualism’s ability to be deployed in a consequentialist way is a 
virtue, not a vice. This hardly cures all of textualism’s ills, but 
the fact that the approach can be, and sometimes is, used with a 
pragmatic sensitivity to policy consequences is a source of some 
reassurance against the fears of textualist mindlessness.46 But 
  
 41 See Krishnakumar, supra note 39, at 225-27. 
 42 See id. at 250-51 tbl.2. 
 43 McGowan, supra note 39, at 175. 
 44 Id. at 173. 
 45 Id. at 176, 183-88. 
 46 See W. Va. Univ. Hosps. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 113 (1991) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (criticizing textualism for interpreting laws through “thick grammarian’s 
spectacles”); BREYER, supra note 3, at 91 (textualism is missing necessary context for 
language); Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat, 77 MINN. L. REV. 241, 
250, 258 (1992) (textualism as literalism). 
1016 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:3 
 
its concern with consequences should be acknowledged more 
forthrightly so that it can be analyzed more systematically. 
When textualism’s defenders—including Justice Scalia—deny 
this trait and seek shelter in formalist justification alone, 
productive normative analysis of this sort is more easily avoided. 
The basic question to be addressed, I suggest, is not whether an 
interpretive approach is consequentialist, but how it is. We 
ought, then, to move from the mode of revelation to one of 
evaluation—that is, to a mode in which the particular ways that 
different interpretive methodologies that encourage interpreters 
to weigh policy consequences can be compared, contrasted, and 
assessed in careful relation to one another. That is an important 
set of comparative questions to which scholars might 
productively turn. 
Textualism, intentionalism, purposivism, and virtually 
any credible approach to statutory interpretation will begin 
with the language, but the approach will be crucially shaped by 
how it selects from among the plausible interpretations. That is 
where, we have seen, the consideration of consequences enters 
the analysis. Plainly, textualism does not consider 
consequences in the same way that intentionalism or 
purposivism does, for it does so by using text and canons as the 
launching pad for this analysis. Is that the best way to consider 
consequences? Setting aside questions of candor, it is quite 
threadbare. It gives the interpreter little with which to work to 
identify and assess the policy consequences likely to flow from 
different understandings of the contested statutory langauge.  
Given the ubiquity of some form of consequentialist 
concern across interpretive methods, then, judges, scholars, 
and lawyers might begin to think more systematically about 
the appropriate source of the norms that will guide interpreters 
as they sort through arguments about consequences. One 
obvious source of norms is Congress itself. On this point, the 
ability of intent- or purpose-based approaches to assimilate 
information about the policy consequences that Congress 
sought or feared gives those approaches a functional advantage 
over textualism. And it suggests the particular utility of 
legislative history. Moreover, legislative history has a role to 
play in assessing policy consequences even without fully 
embracing intentionalist or purposivist methods. Putting aside 
the question of what members of Congress may have wanted, 
congressional reports and debates reflect a sustained analysis 
of the relevant policy area. Irrespective of which interpretive 
theory is chosen, in other words, these reports and debates are 
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likely to be a relatively rich source of information about the 
policy area, and therefore about the possible consequences 
associated with different interpretations of the statute.  
Legislative history is not, however, the only plausible 
source of information about the relevant policy consequences. 
Briefing by lawyers, including Brandeis briefs, might 
productively address that issue. Similarly, the view of relevant 
administrative agencies about likely consequences might be 
sought out and considered by judges, even in cases in which the 
agency’s own interpretation of the statute is not at issue. In 
this way, interpretive litigation might function in appropriate 
cases as a forum for developing evidence, in a focused way, 
about the results likely to flow from different interpretations. 
Questions of fact will not and should not replace questions of 
law, but they might usefully inform them. Treating the policy 
consequences of different interpretations as a factual matter 
bearing on interpretation would likely have some procedural 
implications. For example, encouraging policy analysis of this 
sort might entail loosening the grip of the traditional 
distinction between legislative and adjudicative facts in 
appropriate cases.47 And this idea might affect how and when 
summary judgment motions are used in statutory 
interpretation cases. These implications—and others—ought to 
be identified and examined in a thoughtful way.  
To have any shot at improving matters, all of these 
possibilities would require some willingness on the part of 
judicial interpreters to be forthright about the role of 
consequentialist analysis, among other interpretive tools. 
Formidable institutional and cultural forces work against 
openly embracing the idea that judges ought to function as, 
essentially, problem solvers with some necessary policy 
latitude to work through the implications of plausible 
interpretations of a statute. Scholars might play a useful role 
in encouraging that shift by probing less the theory, and more 
the practice, of interpretive methodology. 
  
 47 On the distinction between legislative and adjudicative facts, see 2 
KENNETH C. DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 10.5 
(3d ed. 1994). 
